This paper studies the effect of limited liability on corporate architecture. Corporate architecture is to be interpreted as the organizational instruments firms use to organize themselves into a coordinating, hierarchical ordered association of people. In this paper, it specifically refers to the use of four governance instruments within the firm to control the behavior of employees. These four are decision control rights, reward schemes, information systems and conflict resolution rules. Limited liability influences the way in which an incorporated group of firms employs each of these instruments. The most important effects are that limited liability makes it advantageous to allocate decision rights lower in the organization, use higher-powered reward schemes and economize on information systems. The effects lead to a saving of coordination costs within incorporated groups compared to unincorporated groups. Corporate groups thus differ in their governance arrangement from firms that have not organized in corporate groups. Alternatives that restrict limited liability have the effect of centralizing rights, flattening reward schemes and increasing investment in information systems. If corporate groups have attuned their architecture optimally, then restricting, or abolishing, limited liability generates additional coordination costs.
INTRODUCTION
Limited liability of corporations has been part of our legal landscape for some centuries. 1 Over these years it has generated controversy, but not enough to be abolished. It is still the major central feature of the most important legal form, i.e. the corporation, in which businesses choose to organize their activities. In many instances, the feature of limited liability has led firms to organize their activities in separate corporate shells, giving rise to the phenomenon of corporate groups. 2 Controversy over the pros and cons of corporate groups, and especially the function of limited liability in these groups, has sparked a large literature. For instance, literature that proposes to introduce a form of shareholder liability for corporate torts (Hansmann and Kraakman, 1991; Leebron, 1991; Mendelson, 2002) , liability for shareholder-managers or closely held corporations (Halpern et al., 1980; Leebron, 1991; Mendelson, 2002) , managerial liability (Kraakman, 1984; Thompson, 1994; Glynn, 2004) , but also to abolish veil piercing (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Bainbridge, 2001 Bainbridge, , 2002 ). An important part of this discussion rests on the social cost consequences of limited liability. Limited liability leads to the externalization of risk. Several proposals to alter or curb limited liability are expressly geared to mitigating this externalization problem. However, not only does limited liability lead to the externalization of risk, it also has consequences for the way in which firms organize themselves. It is only fairly recently, due to the work by Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) and Hansmann et al. (2006) , that limited liability has been appreciated as an important part of organizational law. This paper furthers this discussion by focusing on the effects of limited liability on a firm's internal structure, or corporate architecture. 3 Corporate architecture refers to the use of four governance instruments within the firm to control the behavior of employees, i) decision rights, ii) reward schemes, iii) information systems, iv) and conflict resolution rules. This paper argues that liability rules affect corporate architecture in a specific way. The most important effects are that limited liability makes it advantageous to allocate decision rights lower in the organization, use higher-powered reward schemes and economize on information systems. Alternatives that restrict limited liability have the effect of centralizing rights, flattening reward schemes and increasing investment in information systems. The effects of limited liability lead to a saving of coordination costs within incorporated groups compared to unincorporated 2 Blumberg (1986) argues that it is the emergence of corporate groups that leads to additional problems that are not fully appreciated. He proposes to abolish limited liability for wholly owned subsidiaries. 3 The term corporate architecture is loosely based on Jensen and Meckling (1992) , who use the term organizational architecture. I expressly use the term corporate architecture as to refer to the influence of corporate liability on the architecture of the firm. Corporate architecture is to be interpreted as the organizational instruments firms use to organize themselves into a coordinating, hierarchical ordered association of people.
groups. It is this cost saving that has not yet been recognized in the literature. 4 Restricting, or abolishing, limited liability for incorporated groups, then leads to an economic loss, which has to be traded off against the mitigation of the externalization problem. Two caveats must be noted. First, the analysis in this paper is partial in that it abstracts from other factors than limited liability, e.g. tax reasons, or specific operational risk factors, which may influence a firm's decision on its organizational structure. Second, the paper is also not an attempt to hypothesize a single cause-and-effect relationship between instruments and architecture as they may be simultaneously affected by those other factors.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a short introduction on the theory of firm and the instruments of corporate architecture. Section 3 is devoted to the effects of limited liability on corporate architecture. I discuss the effects of limited liability on corporate architecture by comparing the architecture in an incorporated group and an unincorporated group. Section 4 is devoted to proposals to change limited liability and the consequences these proposals have for the architecture of the firm. I explicitly discuss the effects of changing the limited liability regime by making the parent corporation liable and by making corporate officers personally liable as is advocated by some scholars as a remedy to the externalization problem. Section 5 concludes the article.
CORPORATE ARCHITECTURE

THE FIRM AND ITS ORGANIZATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Coase (1937) forcefully argued that there was no room for the problem of economic organization in the standard model of neoclassical economics. He proposed transaction costs as the missing ingredient in a theory of markets and firms. Firms are then an organizational innovation in order to lower transaction costs. Transaction cost theory, developed by Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , posits that governance structures, firms being one of them, economize on the transaction costs that arise due the frequency of the transactions, the uncertainty surrounding them and asset specificity. 5 In agency theory, developed by Jensen 4 Although attention has been paid by researchers to the effects on, e.g. managerial overdeterrence in case of managerial liability (see, e.g., Thompson, 1994; Glynn, 2004) , financial structure (Leebron, 1991; Hansmann and Kraakman, 1991) and organizational choice (Brooks, 2002) , none has looked at the effects on corporate architecture.
5 Asset specificity relates to the situation in which one of the participants to a contract needs to invest ex ante in order to make the product. The fact that he has to invest before any profit is to and Meckling (1976) firms are seen as a (legal) fiction serving as a nexus for contracting relationships among individuals. Agency costs arise due to goal divergence and information asymmetry between principal and agent. Legally defined organizational forms save transaction costs due to a saving of contract writing costs beforehand and a minimization of the screening effort by suppliers of inputs. 6 Property rights theory, notably furthered by Demsetz (1967) , is used by Grossman and Hart (1986) , Hart and Moore (1990) , and Hart (1995) t o e x p l a i n o w n e r s h i p , t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f r i g h t s a n d t h e i n c e n t i v e s associated with ownership. Rajan and Zingales (1998, 2001) take the theory in a different direction by focusing on the access to a critical resource from which the power comes with which an entrepreneur can direct others. 7 These theories on the firm explain or predict why firms, or certain elements, not only look the way they look, but also why that is efficient. Nevertheless, not one of them can be considered a full theory of the firm (Hart, 1989 (Hart, , 1995 Zingales, 2000) . All theories, though, specify organizational instruments that are to be seen as an essential part of a firm's structure. In transaction cost theory, governance modes, i.e. firms and markets, are differentially analyzed. Williamson (1985) discusses the dimensions in which firms differ from markets, i.e. on the authority relation (fiat versus court, or third party arbitrage), incentive scheme (low versus high-powered) and measurement system (high versus low auditing intensity). Agency theory emphasizes the role of the reward scheme, monitoring and bonding instruments in agency relations to minimize agency costs. Property rights theory emphasizes the role of residual control rights together with residual cash flow rights as the instruments that are to be allocated. I posit that these theories yield four organizational instruments that are used in any firm. These four are control rights, reward schemes, information system and conflict resolution rule. I discuss these below. be made, makes him vulnerable to opportunistic expropriation of his part of the cash flow. If no credible guarantees can be given to him, then he might not be willing to sign the contract. Transaction costs theory operates under the assumptions of information asymmetry, opportunism and bounded rationality. 6 These are the most obvious transaction costs saving reasons (see, more generally, Cooter and Ulen, 2004:211) . However, if these standard contracts contain mandatory rules, which is the case when looked at the different incorporation 'contracts', then efficiency losses may occur if such rules do not fit the preferences of participants. See Cooter and Ulen, (2004:218) . Bainbridge (2002:31-33) explains this in a corporate context and argues that many mandatory rules in most instances actually are also the preferred ones; but see, e.g., Bratton (1989) and Eisenberg (1999) for criticism on this easy going way with mandatory rules by contractarians.
7 A difference with property rights theory, according to Rajan and Zingales (1998) , is that their theory can adequately explain an organization such as the Mafia where property rights theory cannot.
Property Rights, Control Rights and Reward Schemes
Property rights theory holds that residual control rights matter. It matters, because with the allocation of these rights the holder can then decide upon the usage of the asset. The decision on use depends in large part on the benefits the holder of the rights may derive from that use. In property rights theory, residual decision rights and residual cash flow rights are coupled. He who decides on the use also incurs the costs and the benefits of that decision. In that sense, the coupling of rights with cash flow is also directly a reward scheme. 8 However, this coupling is in no way mandatory. Control rights and cash flow rights need not be allocated together. In agency relations, an agent is allocated specific decision rights in order to do some tasks the principal has delegated to him. Jensen and Meckling (1992) , using the idea of residual control right as developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) , develop the argument that in firms decision rights are allocated to those employees who have the decision-relevant knowledge together with a control system to monitor these employees. But whereas the residual control rights analyzed by Grossman and Hart are alienable, the decision rights that are allocated within a firm are non-alienable, i.e. they cannot be sold or partly contracted out by any employee, without prior consent of officers and/or board of directors (and ultimately: the owner of the shares of the firm). Decision rights flow from the top of the hierarchy to lower levels, but cash flow rights do not necessarily follow. In this way decision rights can be stripped from their cash flow rights and allocated to lower levels in the firm. 9 Fama and Jensen (1983) explore the consequences of the separation of ownership and control for the way in which decision processes in firms are organized. They argue that such a separation results in a functional separation of ratification and monitoring from initiation and implementation. The initiation and the implementation activities associated with decision rights are allocated to lower hierarchical levels in the firm, while the ratification and the monitoring activities are allocated to subsequent higher levels within the firm. Firms may thus not only separate decision rights and cash flow rights, but also specific activities associated with the decision rights. The theory developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998, 2001) suggests 8 I f r e s i d u a l c o n t r o l i s e q u a l i z e d w i t h r e s i d u a l c a s h f l o w r i g h t s , t h e n --a c c o r d i n g t o t h e neoclassical paradigm of rational wealth maximization--the person holding these rights decides upon the usage in such a way that it will deliver him the greatest wealth. If we do not assume such a paradigm, then we end up either in constrained optimizing (see Williamson, 1985) or satisfying (see Simon, 1978) . Constrained optimizing in that any one person only evaluates a very limited number of alternatives in a limited way (first order effects); satisfying in that any alternative is acceptable once it crosses a certain (even ambiguous) threshold.
9 Budgets are an interesting corporate tool. See Jensen and Meckling (1992) . Budgets convey decision rights, including limited cash flow (spending) rights, specify the information that is needed to evaluate performance, and may form the basis on which to reward employees or divisions.
that access rights are allocated to lower levels in the firm. These non-alienable rights give a person the right of access to a resource, which may be tangible or not, in order to combine his talents with that asset in order to produce for the firm. 10 According to Rajan and Zingales (1998:415) , internal organization is the regulation of access to critical resources.
Whether access is regulated, or control rights are allocated, the person on whom these decision rights are bestowed, will be rewarded according to a predefined contractual scheme. This may incorporate fixed, variable or both of these reward elements based on some specific performance criterion. In transaction cost theory, Williamson (1985) considers low and high-powered incentives, most easily associated with firms and markets respectively. However, within firms reward schemes may also be used that differ in their incentive intensity. The choice of the reward scheme depends, apart from the usual motivational arguments, on information asymmetry and opportunistic expropriation possibilities (see Cheung, 1983; Williamson, 1985) . If the activities are easily observable and verifiable, then the reward scheme can be higher-powered; this is less so, if the activities have multiple important dimensions and are less easily observable. Higher-powered incentives then lead to suboptimal behavior towards the imperfect measure (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992:228) .
Information System
In an agency relation, the principal needs to monitor the agent in order to ascertain performance, to deter strategic behavior and to reward the agent.
Monitoring necessitates an information (sharing) system. The information system used in the firm has to deliver details on the decision activities in order to monitor and ratify these, and to reward employees. A separation of decision activities as envisaged by Fama and Jensen (1983) i s i m p o s s i b l e i f t h e information concerning these activities cannot become available. Firms separating these activities are thus in need of a system capable of producing the required data. Regarding multinational enterprises, Williamson (1981 Williamson ( :1556 argues that the multidivisional organization form needs to be coupled with a monitoring and control apparatus.
Conflict Resolution Rule
Transaction cost theory stresses the idea that due to circumstances unforeseen at the negotiation stage, the mutual beneficial nature of a relation may change adversely for one of the parties. Such a change may inadvertently become an incentive for ex post opportunistic behavior that may drain any ex post value to either of the parties. Although bounded rationality prevents parties from writing complete contracts covering all contingencies, parties can accommodate such changes by providing a conflict resolution rule. In market settings, different forms of arbitration are identifiable, i.e. courts or forms of private arbitration. The choice of a specific type of conflict resolution rule depends largely on asset specificity (Williamson, 1985:72-77) . The rule will become more complex the more participants rely on each other to honor the initial agreement (Klein, 1978; Williamson, 1979 Williamson, , 1985 Hart and Moore, 1988) . In firms a different type of conflict resolution rule exists: it is based on control rights. With the allocation of residual control rights, the conflict resolution rule is simply that the holder of these rights decides on conflicting uses. Such a rule will become more complex with higher levels of asset specificity. For instance, employees especially want protection for the amount invested in human capital, while employers want to protect themselves for strategic appropriation of part of the quasi rents the firm generates (Williamson 1985:249) . Contracts will thus contain severance pay rules in combination with noncompetition clauses. However, a conflict resolution rule is not only necessary for termination of contracts within firms, it is also needed as an instrument to solve other conflicts than those that lead directly to termination. Conflicts within firms may also be settled with, for example, forced transfer, demotion, career stop and fines. 11 Note that these instruments are also closely related to the access rights a person has. They all lead to a lowering of the value of the specific capital of a person having access to a critical resource. The way in which the conflict rule is applied within the firm signals to employees what kind of behavior is (un)wanted. It thus enforces and elicits certain behavior. With this, it has an ex ante incentive effect on the amount employees invest in specific human capital. Such investments have also the effect of bonding employees to the firm, as their value outside the firm will be lower than inside it.
LIMITED LIABILITY
Standard law and economic reasoning implies that limited liability generates external effects. 12 Limited liability ultimately means that a party need not accept liability for certain actions that harm a third party. The party generating these costs may legally let it fall where it falls, without any possibility for those 11 Given the general rules provided in criminal law, it is normally not necessary for parties to organize punishments for theft themselves. But see Richman (2004) , who finds that such punishments may be privately organized.
12 See Bainbridge (2002) and the references in the introduction.
affected to claim damages. The originating party may simply walk away by initiating bankruptcy proceedings. In bankruptcy, the tort claim ranks as an ordinary claim and shares in the proceeds with the other (ordinary) creditors. Limited liability thus has the effect that part of the costs of a decision will not be borne by those that actually make that decision. These costs then drop out of the deliberation as to whether a specific activity is economically interesting. The result is an overinvestment in these activities. If such behavior cannot be checked (and/or priced) by those that are affected by it, then limited liability generates social costs. Although limited liability thus has a severe drawback, i.e. social costs, it nevertheless is a pervasive legal aspect of our economies. In the end, people are essentially limited liable. Corporate law extends this form of limited liability to shareholders of corporations: they (like any other provider of capital) are only obliged to provide the capital they have promised, but not to cover additional costs that surpass their initial contribution (Bainbridge, 2002:126) . Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) and Hansmann et al. (2006) discuss limited liability from the perspective of organizational law. Hansmann et al. (2006) define the concept of entity shielding as the protection of the assets of the corporation from the owners' personal creditors. Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) coin the term asset partitioning for legal rules that generate this effect. These asset-partitioning rules together give rise to two forms of shielding: entity shielding and owner shielding. The first form shields firms from creditors of their owners; the second form shields owners from creditors of the firm. Together both forms of shielding save transaction costs in that creditors of the corporation need not bother to monitor personal creditors and personal creditors of owners need not bother to monitor the financial condition of the corporation. It also generates transaction costs in that a debtor may opportunistically exploit shielding by moving personal assets into subsidiaries, in order to appropriate personal creditors and, vice versa, moving assets of the firm to the owners of the firm. In the discussion below, I use the term limited liability to comprise both forms of shielding, because in the prior literature this distinction has not been made and limited liability thus is the more common term and, next, for ease of exposition, because both forms are necessary in the discussion on corporate architecture.
This legal constellation of limited liability has generated a long and lasting controversy among law and economics scholars whether this rule should be kept, altered, or abolished altogether. All alternatives have pros and cons and the result until now has been that nothing has changed in the current regime on limited liability, or better: the way firms may legally incorporate. In this paper, I do not enter into that debate; I focus on the effects of limited liability, or a change in the regime, on corporate architecture.
LIMITED LIABILITY EFFECTS ON CORPORATE ARCHITECTURE
With limited liability, firms obtain an additional organizational instrument. It becomes a matter of strategic policy how the firm is to be structured in a legal way. Incorporation not only offers dispersed shareholders limited liability, but the regime is also available to a parent corporation that is the sole shareholder in its incorporated subsidiaries. Limited liability thus makes it possible to structure the firm as a corporate group. Groups are ubiquitous in the corporate landscape. 13 They provide two corporate architectural benefits to parents: first, with the decision of the parent company to incorporate each risky business in a separate corporation, it compartmentalizes the risks of each individual business into a subsidiary corporation. With this, the individual subsidiary corporations are shielded from damage claims that may arise from the activities of any of the other subsidiaries. 14 Second, as a shareholder, the parent company need not provide additional capital in the event that one of its subsidiaries is confronted with a damage claim that more than erases all of the equity of the subsidiary. 15 These two benefits are offset by one cost factor. Creditors will demand additional collateral, specific guarantees or higher prices in order to minimize or compensate for the risk that the subsidiary will fail its obligations. 16 For creditors contracting with the corporation, the social cost that limited liability imposes is thus again transferred to the parent corporation making the strategic decisions.
Limited liability thus carries two distinct benefits for corporate architecture. However, that is not all; it also influences the way in which the organizational instruments of corporate architecture are used. Consider the case of a firm that owns multiple risky businesses and is organized in a corporate group structure and compare this with a firm that has not done so; this latter firm has chosen to organize itself into several (risky) divisions but not into separate 13 At least that is the presumption of all the research in this area, although actual empirical data on corporate groups is hard to get.
14 This is the entity-shielding part of limited liability. In the situation that the firm would not have been structured as a corporate group, but that all businesses would have been incorporated in a sole corporation, all the assets of the corporation could be used to satisfy the claims of the (tort) creditors of one of the businesses.
15 With this, the parent need not sell part of its equity in the other incorporated subsidiaries, or even sell some specific assets of its subsidiaries in order to satisfy that claim. This is the ownershielding part of limited liability.
16 This is the central reasoning why voluntary creditors need not be protected additionally for limited liability. Voluntary creditors are those that willfully transact with the company, i.e. they have the opportunity to decide whether or not to transact. Involuntary creditors do not have such a choice; they become creditors due to the tortuous acts of the subsidiary corporation. In bargain-settings, voluntary creditors need to take care of their specific interests. See e.g. Bainbridge (2002:134) and Thompson (1994) .
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corporations. Given the fact that limited liability compartmentalizes subsidiary risk and protects the parent, it affects the way in which the parent chooses to control subsidiaries. In a corporate group, the risk of damage claims will be confined to a corporate subsidiary. Risks will not spill over as it will in firms that do not have such a structure. Compartmentalization makes it less necessary to control risks on the parent level, as it will be in the case of one corporation. It is even the other way around: risky activities will be stimulated, because limited liability insulates the other subsidiaries and the parent (Blumberg, 1986) . In a corporate group, the result is a higher level of investment in risky activities in subsidiary corporations than in the unincorporated group. 17 This differential effect due to limited liability will also affect the use of the organizational instruments within these two types of structures. Table 1 below specifies these effects for the four instruments discussed above. Table 1 specifies the differential effect of limited liability upon the architecture of the corporation. It compares the use of four organizational instruments in incorporated and unincorporated groups.
Limited liability affects the allocation of decision rights between parent and subsidiary. If the parent compartmentalizes business risks in corporate subsidiaries, it will not matter to her from a liability perspective whether decision rights stay at the level of the subsidiary board, or are assigned to lower levels within the subsidiary corporations. To the parent it will not matter at what level in the subsidiary corporation a tortuous act is committed. Although liability may flow upwards via a vicarious liability rule, 18 it will halt at the level of the board of the subsidiary. A wealth-maximizing parent will thus strive to push down decision rights within the subsidiary to that level where the specific knowledge is located to make the wealth-maximizing business decisions. 19 Thus, in corporate groups, as compared to an unincorporated group, decision rights will be more decentralized. Lower hierarchical levels will be allocated initiation and implementation rights, and consequently lower levels will receive ratification and monitoring rights. This obviously saves information costs and the costs associated with the wrong decision (or no decision at all) because of too little information at higher levels. Given a system of limited liability, corporate groups should have lower information costs and have a more decentralized allocation of decision rights than unincorporated groups.
This set-up of decision rights implies that the reward scheme will also differ between the two settings. Bringing decision rights to lower levels in the organization means that on such lower levels employees will have more discretionary decision making powers. In a limited sense, they may decide as they see fit. For instance, discretionary spending levels, or budget rights, and the rights to bind the corporation contractually to third parties will reach lower levels in corporate groups. Given this higher level of decision making freedom, compared to the unincorporated group, corporate groups will, or need to, rely more extensively on reward schemes to align the interests of the decision makers with the aims of the parent and ultimately of the shareholders of that parent. Such reward schemes will be higher-powered (in the terminology of Williamson (1985) ), i.e. include a more extensive use of variable components in the pay package of managers. Such variable components need to stimulate managers to take the risks that are worth taking, at least in the eyes of the parent. One of the major problems associated with reward schemes is suboptimal behavior due to measurability problems and ratchet effects (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) . If the suboptimal behavior associated with the higher-powered schemes ultimately leads to a higher chance of committing tortuous acts in incorporated groups, then the costs associated with suboptimal reward schemes differ between the two forms. Corporate groups can shoulder such 18 With a vicarious liability rule, a principal is held liable for an agent's misconduct. In case of an employee of a corporation, it is ultimately the board of directors that-as principals-are vicariously liable for the conduct of the employees. In their duty as directors, the liability attaches to the corporation. At least this common interpretation follows from tort and agency principles. See generally Kornhauser (1982) and Sykes (1984) , more specifically Thompson (1994) and Glynn (2004) .
19 Jensen and Meckling (1992) argue that specific knowledge makes it necessary to decentralize decision rights. Limited liability lowers the costs of such decentralization. tort risks much more easily than unincorporated groups. This strengthens the contention that reward schemes in incorporated groups will be higher-powered compared to unincorporated groups.
The third instrument is the information system. Given the different setup of the allocation of decision rights and reward schemes, it is obvious that the information system will be affected as well. At first sight, it will be the corporate group that will have the more elaborate information system with its allocation of decision rights to lower levels. However, this need not be the case. The important aspect here is that with an allocation of decision rights to lower levels, not only initiation and implementation rights, but also monitoring and ratification rights will be vested in lower levels of the corporate hierarchy. It follows that the relevant decision making information need not be sent further up in the hierarchy than that level which has the monitoring and ratification rights. Only summary information will be passed on to the higher levels, where these higher levels will not again substantially review these decisions. Otherwise, the cost saving associated with lower level decision making will be lost to the group. In the unincorporated group, decision rights will not be vested as low in the organization as in the incorporated group. This means that more decisions will be taken by higher hierarchical levels. In order to monitor and ratify decisions, these levels will require information that in incorporated groups will not flow upwards. Such an information flow is needed, because the unincorporated group needs to make decisions on a higher level in order to identify and manage the risks associated with business activities. This argument works the other way around as well. With decision rights lower in the hierarchy, commands from higher level officials may or can be less detailed compared to the unincorporated group. The details will be added to the command by management lower in the hierarchy. In unincorporated groups, leaving these details to lower hierarchical levels would mean that more discretion would become vested in these levels, effectively undermining the control structure of the unincorporated group. It follows that in unincorporated groups not only more information must flow upwards in the hierarchy, but also that more information will flow to lower hierarchical levels than in incorporated groups.
The fourth instrument, conflict resolution rule, will not differ that much between both settings. Conflict resolution, i.e. the use of command and the punishment of aberrant behavior, will be more or less the same, although, obviously, in the incorporated group, more leeway exists for aberrant behavior. Given the additional decision making leeway in incorporated groups on lower hierarchical levels, though, it is probable that conflicts ensue less often. Less detailed information will be reviewed by top level management leading to a lower incidence of disputes. However, the way in which this mechanism operates will not differ that much between the two settings.
In discussing the effects of limited liability on corporate architecture above, no attention has been given to any measures an unincorporated group may take in order to reduce the coordination costs differential with the incorporated group. Two measures may partially compensate for the cost differential: insurance and contracting out. The unincorporated group may insure itself against claims arising out of tortuous acts of divisional employees. Such an insurance policy would have the same effect as the owner-shielding effect of limited liability. Still a cost differential will persist, because an incorporated group need not pay the insurance premiums and the insurer may attach conditions to its policy that do not attach to limited liability in the incorporated group. A second way to reduce the cost difference, is to mimic limited liability by contracting out. The unincorporated group may contract out certain activities to other firms. The risks of these activities are then confined to another corporate entity. Although it thus mimics limited liability, the group that contracts out misses two architectural instruments. 20 Decision rights cannot be retained and information will not be as readily available compared to the situation of keeping the activities within the group. Such a contracting out seems less likely if the activities are part of what the management defines as the core of the group. Contracting out may then be an instrument to reduce corporate exposure to risk for certain activities, but not for all. The consequence will be that unincorporated groups, in managing their portfolio of activities, may decide to contract out certain activities sooner than will incorporated groups.
RESTRICTING LIMITED LIABILITY AND EFFECTS ON CORPORATE ARCHITECTURE
In the preceding section, the hypothesis is developed that limited liability affects corporate architecture of corporations. Incorporated groups differ in their use of organizational instruments from unincorporated groups. The major positive consequence of this difference in corporate architecture is that the incorporated group saves on coordination costs; the major negative consequence is the externalization of risk. This latter effect has generated a large literature. 21 Several scholars propose remedial action in order to reduce, 20 Apart from the argument that for some specific reason the group is best situated to bear these risks. 21 See, among others, the literature cited in the introduction. The discussion has become more complex due to the mingling of public and close corporations. Public corporations with dispersed (passive) shareholders are, from a governance perspective, of a different kind than close corporations or eliminate the social costs of limited liability, via either abolishing it or adapting it to circumstances. With respect to the issue of corporate architecture, two forms are relevant: the introduction of enterprise liability, having the effect of holding parents liable for debts incurred in subsidiary corporations, and officer liability, making corporate officers liable for torts committed within the corporation. Both of these forms have the potential of changing the way in which corporations use the organizational instruments. I consider these in turn below.
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
With limited liability, firms have the option to construct corporate groups in which the organizational instruments will be employed differently when compared to unincorporated groups. The fact that a firm has this option has fuelled the debate on the social cost of limited liability (e.g. see Blumberg, 1986; Bainbridge, 2001 Bainbridge, , 2002 Glynn, 2004; Lopucki, 1998) . One of the proposed solutions to the externalization problem is to hold the corporate group in its entirety, including the parent shareholder, liable for all the debts incurred. Such a form of liability is known in the literature as enterprise liability. Enterprise liability is debated among legal scholars, because there is as yet no dogmatic theory that underlies the cases in which corporate structures are pierced. 22 If a parent will always be held liable for debts of its subsidiaries, then, effectively, no limited liability will exist for a parent. Consequently, corporate groups cannot compartmentalize risk in the same way as they can when they are limitedly liable. It yields the situation in which the corporate architecture of a corporate group is similar to the one of an unincorporated group. Corporate architecture of corporate groups will then presumably adjust to resemble the architecture of unincorporated groups.
The doctrine of enterprise liability, however, does not yield such a situation. Corporate groups are not held liable for debts of subsidiaries just because they are in control, or considered a part of a group. It takes more to establish enterprise with a single active shareholder who may also function as corporate director. In public corporations, holding individual (personal) shareholders liable effectively reduces much of one of the major benefits of limited liability, i.e. portfolio diversification, while this is not the case in close corporations where the shareholder/director is in a permanent state of conflict between his personal and corporate interest. In this paper, I focus on the situation of the public corporation and large close corporations and not the small close corporation. 22 This position is taken by Bainbridge (2002 Bainbridge ( , 2001 . However, scholars also argue that enterprise liability should be of a different kind than shareholder liability in the case of public corporations. Nevertheless, despite the fact of this consensus opinion, no definitive answer has been formulated how enterprise liability should be formed that is distinctive from veil piercing (see Blumberg, 1986; Bainbridge, 2001 Bainbridge, , 2002 Lopucki, 1998; and Thompson, 1994). liability: it needs to be shown that the 'parent is employing the subsidiary to perpetrate a fraud and that this was the proximate cause of the plaintiff injury' (Bainbridge, 2002:183-184) . Control in itself is thus, although necessary, not enough to establish enterprise liability. 23 Parents obviously want to be in control of their subsidiaries, but do not face enterprise liability by that fact alone. The current doctrine of enterprise liability therefore does not give corporate parents an incentive to change the way in which they control their subsidiaries. Under the current doctrine, corporate architecture need not change. Limited liability is still the relevant rule for corporate groups.
OFFICER LIABILITY
Another way-other than holding a corporate shareholder liable-to try to internalize externalized risks, is to hold officers of the corporation personally vicariously liable for corporate torts. This has been proposed by several authors in order to mitigate the risk externalization effect of limited liability (Kraakman, 1984; Thompson, 1994; Glynn, 2004) . However, apart from mitigating the consequences of risk externalization, officer liability for corporate torts also affects corporate architecture.
Officer liability will affect corporate architecture if officers cannot fully insure tort risks and have inadequate diversification possibilities with respect to their human capital. Under these assumptions, officer liability will lead officers to set care levels higher than shareholders will find optimal. 24 In order to reach a higher level of care, via a lower level of tort risk and/or lower expected ex post tort damages, decision rights within any corporation will need to be more centrally held instead of allocated to the lowest possible level. Reward schemes will be lower-powered in order to reduce the rewards of risk taking. Information systems will deliver more detailed data to managers at higher levels. 25 The set-up of corporate architecture in any corporation will thus be dependent on whether or not a regime of vicarious officer liability exists. 26 The next step is to analyze 23 This is the same with the veil piercing doctrine. See Bainbridge (2002) . 24 Assuming shareholders can and will diversify and thus will accept a higher level of risk given any pay-off. This is especially relevant when officers are compensated via their pay-schemes and not via insurance.
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A p a r t f r o m t h e s e a r ch i t e c t u r e e f f e c t s , t o p o f f ic e r s m a y a l s o e m p l o y o t h e r t o r t r is k minimizing strategies, e.g. selling or discontinuing businesses with a non-negligible tort risk and building and maintaining reserves (Carney, 1990) . 26 The introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) In the United States in 2002 provides evidence that legal rules affect corporate architecture. The Act introduces a criminal penalty on directors when they certify financial statements that they know do not '[…] fairly present the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer (section 906 (b) 1-2). This raises personal costs for directors, which cannot be covered by insurance. Recent research on the effects of SOX whether a difference exists between the set-up of corporate architecture in the corporate versus the unincorporated form. Such a difference arises, because limited liability shields parent officers in incorporated groups for vicarious liability for corporate torts committed under a subsidiary officer. 27 Subsidiary officers know that they will be held liable for tortuous acts in their subsidiary and that they cannot pass that liability on to parent officers. The upshot is an agency problem between subsidiary officers and parent officers. Presumably, subsidiary officers will either try to minimize tort risk, e.g. by manipulating the asset base (i.e. the level of business risk), financing policy, or obtaining insurance and indemnification via the parent. 28 Although the parent officer, or shareholders, may want a higher level of (tort) risk taking in subsidiaries, subsidiary officers try to offset this propensity via incorporating the costs of such strategies in their pay/insurance package and/or adapting the level of business risk. Solving that agency problem requires extensive oversight from the parent in order to ascertain that business risks are being taken. Such a divergence of aims between parent and subsidiary officer need not occur in unincorporated groups. If division managers do not qualify as officers, then they will be able to escape vicarious liability in the unincorporated group. The top officers of unincorporated groups will be vicariously liable, but a divergence of aims with respect to business risk need not occur, because there is no corporate veil to insulate these top officers against the tort liability. Qualifying division managers as officers, and thus vicariously liable, does not change that result. Officers on both hierarchical levels will be vicariously liable. Consequently, the agency problem does not crop up in the same way as it does in incorporated groups. The effect is that corporate architecture in the corporate group under a personal vicarious liability regime for officers (including subsidiary officers), will still differ from the unincorporated group. The parent officer in the incorporated group prefers to use a highpowered incentive scheme and to intensify monitoring to ensure that the decision rights that are delegated are used. The top officer in the unincorporated shows that the administrative costs of complying with the rules have risen steeply from the period before SOX (Carney, 2005; Clark, 2005; Ribstein, 2005) .
27 Glynn (2004) argues that in his proposal to hold officers vicariously liable, veil piercing or enterprise liability does not matter, because the criterion he uses is direct supervisory control by officers, irrespective of whether they are parent or subsidiary officers.
28 Rele va n t h ere is th e rema rk ab o ve, th a t if in s uran ce/in demn ifica tio n is o n ly pa rtia lly available, managers are risk averse and inadequately diversified, then subsidiary officers will overinvest in care. The effect on the corporate architecture of the subsidiary will then also be the same, although subsidiary officers, compared to parent officers, will have less opportunity to alter the allocation of such rights, reward schemes and information system requirements. This will place more weight on the alternative of insurance/indemnification. group wants to mitigate risk-taking behavior of lower level officers via centralizing decision rights and using a low-powered incentive scheme.
CONCLUSION
This paper studies the effect of limited liability on corporate architecture. Corporate architecture is to be interpreted as the organizational instruments with which firms organize themselves into a coordinating, hierarchical ordered association of people. It refers to the use of four governance instruments within the firm to control the behavior of (among others) employees: decision control rights, reward schemes, information systems and conflict resolution rules. Limited liability influences the way in which an incorporated group of firms employs each of these instruments. An efficient use of the governance instruments in such a group implies that lower hierarchical levels, incorporated in subsidiaries, will have more discretionary decision rights, higher-powered incentives and less information requirements than a group that does not organize its business risks in incorporated subsidiaries. Corporate groups thus differ in their governance arrangement from firms that have not organized in corporate groups. The result is that incorporated groups save on coordination costs when compared to unincorporated groups.
Introducing liability for a parent in a corporate group, i.e. enterprise liability, yields that compartmentalization of business risks will no longer be relevant. Corporate architecture in corporate groups will then look similar to the architecture in unincorporated groups. However, the doctrine of enterprise liability, as currently employed in the United States, does not pierce the corporate veil that easily; control in itself is not enough to justify parent liability for corporate torts. Therefore, the doctrine does not give parents an incentive to change the way in which they control their subsidiaries and thus corporate architecture will not change.
Introducing officer liability for officers will have the effect that decision rights within any corporation will be more centrally held, reward schemes will be lower-powered and information systems will be more intrusive. However, in case limited liability still shields the parent officer, then officer liability will not change the relative attractiveness of the incorporated versus the unincorporated group form. In both forms officers may be held liable for corporate torts, but the compartmentalization of business risks in the corporate group will insulate the parent officer from liability for subsidiaries' debts, where this will not be the case in the unincorporated group. Furthermore, an agency problem crops up in incorporated groups. If indemnification is only a partial solution, then officers in subsidiary corporations will act strategically to minimize the liability risks they personally have to bear. Such strategic behavior makes a more direct form of oversight, from the parent's perspective, necessary. The incorporated group will then still differ from the unincorporated group in its use of the organizational instruments, especially in the use of higher-powered reward schemes, in order to elicit risk-taking behavior.
Restricting, or abolishing, liability has the consequence of changing corporate architecture in such a way that the incorporated group, when compared to the unincorporated group, loses much of the cost savings associated with the differential use of decision rights, reward schemes and information systems. This economic loss must be traded off by the lower social costs of having fewer tort cases.
